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Abstract The DECT Standard Cipher (DSC) is a 64-bit
key stream cipher used in the Digital Enhanced Cordless
Telecommunications (DECT) standard to protect the confi-
dentiality of the communications. In this paper, we present an
improved cryptanalysis ofDSC that ismore effective than the
prior best known one introduced by Nohl–Tews–Weinmann
(NTW).Our knownplaintext attack requires less than 2.8min
of voice communication (214 keystreams) compared to the
more than 11 min (216 keystreams) of the NTW attack to
retrieve the key with an equivalent success rate. Our attack
yields similar improvements using control data encrypted
with the first 9 bits of the keystream, instead of voice, reach-
ing a success rate of 50 % by analysing 213 keystreams in
comparison with the 215 keystreams required by the NTW
attack to achieve equivalent results. We have successfully
applied our attack in a controlled environment against actual
DECT communications. Furthermore, we have tuned our
attack toworkmore effectivelywhen the knowledge of plain-
text is not 100 % accurate. On the basis of these results, we
think that the most appropriate measure to secure the privacy
of DECT voice communications is the effective roll-out of
the DSC-2 cipher in DECT equipment.
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1 Introduction
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunication (DECT) is
an ETSI standard [5] used in cordless telephony, widely
deployed worldwide both in residential and enterprise envi-
ronments.1 In traditional residential scenarios, the DECT
base station (Fixed Part or FP) is directly connected to the
analogue telephone line and provides telephony and a battery
recharge point for one or more wireless handsets (Portable
Parts or PP). This is the scenario that is typically found today,
where the DECT cordless phones have replaced a significant
number of classic wired phones.
In enterprise environments DECT cordless phones are
often integrated intoUnifiedCommunicationSystems. These
systems integrating several types of voice and data communi-
cations, such as VoIP and videoconferencing, start to become
available in the consumer market. Nowadays it is common to
find low-costDECTcordless phones able to handle both land-
line andVoIP communications. Despite themassive adoption
of mobile telephony, the DECT standard has reinforced its
position as one of the main wireless communication proto-
cols in Smart Home ecosystems.
When encryption is not used, the DECT voice commu-
nications are vulnerable to remote eavesdropping attacks, as
demonstrated by Lucks et al. [7] employing special purpose
hardware. More recently, Sanchez et al. [12] demonstrated
that eavesdropping of non-encrypted DECT voice communi-
cations can be effectively performed using widely available
1 According to ETSI the number of DECT devices sold reaches 820
million with a proliferation of 100 million new devices per year.
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low-cost Software Defined Radios (SDR). To mitigate these
vulnerabilities and to protect the confidentiality of the com-
munications, the DECT standard foresees the usage of a
proprietary stream cipher, theDECTStandardCipher (DSC).
Currently, the privacy of the personal voice communications
of hundreds of millions of citizens depends on the security
of this encryption algorithm.
The DSC algorithm is referenced in the DECT standard
but the details of its design and implementation were only
made available under non-disclosure agreements. In [11],
Nohl et al. reverse engineered DSC from a hardware imple-
mentation and published its internal details along with a
reference software implementation. The internal details of
theDECTStandardAuthenticationAlgorithm (DSAA), used
in DECT for authentication purposes, were also available
under non-disclosure agreements only. The details of the
DSAA became known to the academic community when
Lucks et al. [7] published a cryptanalysis of the cipher,
reverse engineering it from a hardware implementation.
Published cryptanalysis of theDSC cipher is quite limited,
especially when compared to other encryption algorithms
such as A5/1 used in mobile telephony. Nohl et al. [11]
proposed the first cryptanalysis of the algorithm, the Nohl–
Tews–Weinmann (NTW) attack, capable of recovering the
DSC key after analysing large quantities of encrypted traf-
fic. Molter et al. [10] were able to take advantage of weak
random number generators present in some DECT phones
to brute-force the long-term key and decrypt phone calls.
In [9] McHardy et al. demonstrated an active replay attack
against DSC able to decrypt a recorded call by interactively
recovering the keystreams used to encrypt it.
In [1] we presented an attack able to retrieve the long-
term key of a DECT system and derive subsequent session
keys to decrypt voice communications. While this attack is
efficient (approx. 210 operations), it requires that an attacker
eavesdrops the key establishment protocol that takes place
between the handset and the base station as part of the pairing
process of the DECT device.
In [3] we demonstrated that the long-term key can also be
retrieved by physically attacking the base station and tamper-
ing with the memory chip. In this work we also highlighted
the lack of perfect forward secrecy in DECT phones. In pos-
session of the long-term key an attacker can decrypt any
previous communication that might have been recorded (up
to the previous long-term key establishment).
The present article is an extension of the improved crypt-
analysis of the DSC cipher that we have presented in [2],
which requires substantially less plaintext material than the
NTW attack to be equally effective, making it more viable
in practical scenarios. In this paper, we provide additional
information and we describe an enhancement of our attack
able to provide better experimental results in scenarios where


















Fig. 1 Pairing, authentication and session key derivation processes in
DECT
The paper is structured as follows:We start by introducing
the DECT standard and the related underlying cryptographic
mechanisms in Sect. 2 followed by a detailed description of
the DECT Stream Cipher in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we describe
the techniques and tools we have developed to support the
experimental part of our research. In Sect. 5 we describe
the Nohl–Tews–Weinmann attack and its results. Our attack
againstDSC is introduced in Sect. 6 followed by a description
of itsworking implementation in Sect. 7. In Sect. 8wepresent
and analyse the results obtained by our approach. Finally, we
present the conclusions and we outline future research lines
on the topic in Sect. 9.
2 Overview of the cryptographic mechanisms
defined in the DECT standard
The DECT standard [6] includes a set of protocols and algo-
rithms designed to secure the communications. Figure 1
depicts the three main security processes in DECT and the
relationship between them.
The DECT long-term key derivation protocol that we will
refer to as the pairing protocol, is the process defined in the
DECTGeneric Access Profile (GAP) standard that allows an
FP and a PP to agree on a 128-bit long-term key called User
Authentication Key (UAK). This protocol takes place when
a new PP is being registered into an FP and it is a key element
of the GAP profile to ensure interoperability between man-
ufacturers. The UAK value is permanently stored by FP and
PP becoming a shared secret that will be used by subsequent
authentication and session key derivation processes. Often,
when FP and PP are purchased as part of the same set, the
devices come already paired from the manufacturer sharing
the same UAK value. The pairing process is described in
detail in Sect. 2.1.
The session key derivation process is used to determine
a 64-bit random session key, known as the Derived Cipher
Key (DCK), that will be used to encrypt the communication.
Alternatively to this process, the manufacturer could decide
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Fig. 2 Key allocation protocol
Fig. 3 Authentication of a DECT PP
to use a 64-bit Static Cipher Key (SCK) for encryption pur-
poses, set during the manufacturing process, at the expense
of breaking the interoperability of the solution.
2.1 UAK pairing protocol
The main building block of the pairing protocol is the DSAA
algorithm that takes as input a key of 128 bits and a second
value of 64 bits to output a block of 128 bits. Four different
wrappers are defined in the standard around DSAA, denoted
as A11, A12, A21, and A22. The difference between them lies
in the specific processing made over the output, as defined
below.
A11: directly outputs the 128 bits without any post-
processing;
A12: discards the first 32 bits of the output, and the remaining
bits are split in one block of 64 bits and one of 32 bits;
A21: the output is XORed with a fixed value identical for all
DECT equipment;
A22: discards the first 96 bits and outputs the remaining 32
bits as a single output.
The pairing process is depicted in Fig. 2. The UAK is
derived by both peers from the several nonces exchanged
and an Authentication Code (AC). The latter is determined
from a 4-digit PIN code that is permanently stored in the FP
and manually inserted by the operator in the PP to initiate the
process.
At the end of the procedure the FP checks that the X RES1
value it calculated is equal to the RES1 value received from
PP. The PP executes a similar check over the X RES2 and
RES2 values. If the checks succeeded the new UAK calcu-
lated by both peers is accepted and stored permanently.
2.2 Authentication and session key derivation
The PP Authentication procedure is described in Fig. 3. The
output of the A12 algorithm contains the RES1 value trans-
mitted to the FP that uses it to authenticate PP comparing it
with its own calculation.
Should the communication be encrypted using a DCK ,
the second output of A12 will be used as the 64-bit session
key for the DSC cipher to encrypt the communication.
3 The DECT standard cipher
The DECT Standard Cipher (DSC) is a proprietary 64-bit
key stream cipher designed as part of the DECT ETSI stan-
dard [5]. DSC is based on four irregularly clocked Linear
Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) R1, R2, R3, R4 in Galois
configuration and a non-linear output combiner O withmem-
ory z. The cipher is initializedwith a 35-bit long Initialization
Vector and a 64-bit key, respectively, denoted IV and Key.
Each pair of IV and Key is used to produce 720 bits of
keystream that are split in two keyStream segments of 360
bits each. The first segment is used to encrypt the DECT
frames sent by the FP, whereas the second one is used to
encrypt the frames sent by the PP. In each case, the first
40 bits are used to encrypt the C-Channel data (that contains
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Fig. 4 DSC stream cipher
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control data), whilst the rest of the bits are used to encrypt the
B-Field (digitally encoded voice). More details can be found
in the corresponding DECT ETSI standard [5]. The DSC is
depicted in Fig. 4 and formally described in the following
subsections.
3.1 The DSC internal configuration
The internal state of the DSC stream cipher is composed of
81 bits spread amongst the four LFSRs and thememory bit of
the output combiner. The three first registers, R1, R2 and R3,
are used to provide input to the output combiner, as will be
described in detail in Sect. 3.2. The last register, R4, is used
exclusively to control the clocking of the other registers after
each round of the DSC. The four LFSR, depicted in Fig. 4,
are formally described below together with their respective
feedback polynomials:
– Registry R1, 17 bits: x17 + x6 + 1
– Registry R2, 19 bits: x19 + x11 + x4 + x3 + 1
– Registry R3, 21 bits: x21 + x + 1
– Registry R4, 23 bits: x23 + x9 + 1
The initialization of the internal state, also called key loading
procedure, is executed by introducing bit by bit the 64 bits of
the IV (the 35-bit IV padded to 64 bits with 0s) concatenated
with the 64-bit key, XORing them with the most significant
bit of each register. After each insertion, the four registers are
clocked a single time (no irregular clockings are performed
in this step).
After the key loading procedure is completed, 40 “empty”
rounds are executed during which the generated keystream
bits are discarded. Once the initialization procedure is com-
pleted, DSC will start producing keystream bits. Each round
i , starting by round 0, produces a keystream bit denoted as zi .
Keystream bit zi is output at the end of the round i . After each
round, including the initialization rounds, the R4 register is
clocked three times, whereas the three main registers, R1, R2
and R3, are either clocked two or three times depending of
the values of specific bits (displayed with a dark grey back-
ground in Fig. 4) of the three other registers. The number
of times each register is clocked in a specific round, denoted
irr_cli , is determined as follows, where xi, j denotes the j-th
less significant bit of the register i :
irr_cl1 = 2 + (x4,0 ⊕ x2,9 ⊕ x3,10)
irr_cl2 = 2 + (x4,1 ⊕ x1,8 ⊕ x3,10)
irr_cl3 = 2 + (x4,2 ⊕ x1,8 ⊕ x2,9)
3.2 The output combiner
The output combiner O is a cubic function taking as inputs
the two least significant bits of the three main registers, R1,
R2 and R3, and the bit from the memory slot, denoted z in
Fig. 4, corresponding to the previous bit of the keystream. In
every round after the key loading procedure, the bit stored
in the memory slot will be output as a keystream bit and the
new bit produced by the output combiner will replace it in
the memory slot.
The 6 bits from the three main registers taken as input by
the output combiner constitute what is called in the following
the status of the DSC, which is specific to a round number
and it depends on both Key and the IV.
The output combiner is formally defined as follows, where
S = (x1,0, x1,1, x2,0, x2,1, x3,0, x3,1) is the status of the DSC
for the current round:
O(S, z) = x1,1x1,0z ⊕ x2,0x1,1x1,0 ⊕ x1,1z ⊕ x2,1x1,0z
⊕ x2,1x2,0x1,0 ⊕ x3,0x1,0z ⊕ x3,1 ⊕ x3,1z
⊕ x1,1x1,0 ⊕ x3,0x2,0x1,0 ⊕ x2,0x1,1 ⊕ x3,1x1,0
⊕ x2,1 ⊕ x3,0z
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The main purpose of the function is to break the linearity
of the three main registers. Over the 128 possible combina-
tion of inputs (64 possible statuses plus 2 possible values
of the memory slot), half of them output 0 whilst the others
output 1.
At first sight the function seems to be balanced since any
modification of a given status would modify in average the
output bit in 50 % of the cases. However, we have noticed
that the output bit remains the same in 56.25 % of the cases
when only the bits of a single register aremodified.When bits
of at least two registers are modified, the outputs are again
balanced. Furthermore, we have noticed that the probability
that the output bit remains the same is dependent on the input.
We will not elaborate further on this last fact since we do not
use it in our attack.
3.3 Notations used in the rest of the paper
In order to facilitate the readability of the paper, we introduce
some notations that will be used in the following sections.
Ssc(Key, IV), for sc = (c1, c2, c3), is the status of the
DSC, initialized with Key and IV, when the three main
registers are, respectively, clocked c1, c2, and c3 times.
Sl(Key, IV), is the status of the DSC, initialized with Key
and IV, that has been used to produce the bit output at the
end of the round l. When it does not bring confusion, we do
not mention Key and IV.
tci denotes an hypothesis about the number of clocks of
the i register, while ci,l denotes the actual number of clocks
of the i register at the round l.
We abusively call the couple (I V , K S), composed by a
keystream K S and the associated initial vector I V , a sample
of plaintext (or wlog plaintext), as the “real” plaintext can
be recovered from the ciphertext and the keystream. P =
{(I V, K S)} denotes the set of available samples of plaintext.
We extend the XOR operator and define the XOR opera-
tion of two statuseswhere the bits of the statuses aremutually
XORed together.
4 Tools and techniques developed
The cryptanalysis of the DSCmade by Nohl et al. [9] and the
one described in this paper are both known plaintext attacks.
As a consequence, the keystreams produced by the targeted
keymust be known.While it is feasible to simulate such data,
it is not easy to recover it from a real DECT communications.
In order to do so we had to develop new tools that enabled us
to intercept and decrypt DECT communications allowing us
to collect actual keystreams produced by the DSC hardware
implementations. This section describes the several tools and
techniques [1,3,12] we have developed to support the exper-
imental part of the article.
4.1 Passive eavesdropping of non-encrypted
communications
In the cryptanalysis presented in this paper we have used
data taken from actual DECT communications. These data
have been acquired using the Software-defined Radio DECT
sniffer developed internally and described in [12]. TheDECT
sniffer was used in combination with a USRP B200 board
from Ettus Research and a standard VERT-900 antenna. The
implementation is capable of eavesdropping actual DECT
communications saving the sniffed DECT packets in a PCAP
file.
The acquisition of the data was done by placing both an
FP and a PP (the target) together with the DECT SDR sniffer
inside an anechoic chamber. The DECT system was con-
nected to a land-line to simulate an actual phone call. We
have collected data from a wide variety of DECT phones
from several manufacturers.
The analysis of the captured communications revealed
that some phones do not encrypt at all their communications
giving to an eavesdropper direct access to the transmitted
voice. Other phones encrypt only the B-Field data but not
the C-Channel communications. Only recordings of fully
encrypted communications (both C-Channel and B-Field)
were used to test our DSC cryptanalysis attack.
4.2 The pairing attack
As a first step towards being able to test with actual data our
DSC cryptanalysis, we set up a technique to extract the set
of (keystream, IV) and the corresponding 64-bit key used by
the DECT target system to encrypt the communication. In
order to do so, we eavesdrop the pairing process of a given
pair of FP and PP to follow the protocol and derive the nego-
tiated UAK key. Having the UAK key allowed us to derive
subsequentDCKby following the session key derivation pro-
tocol. Implementing this techniquewe noticed that theDECT
pairing protocol is not secure. In the following, we briefly
introduce our attack that is able to determine the UAK by
observing the values exchanged in cleartext during the pro-
tocol. An interested reader should refer to the full article [1]
for more details.
An eavesdropper monitoring the radio link can collect all
values involved in the computation of RES1 and UAK with
the exception of AC . The latter is deterministically computed
from the PIN, which is unknown to an attacker since it is not
exchanged during the protocol. However, the PIN is the only
unknown in the computation of RES1, as described below:
RES1 = A12(A11(RS, Deriv(P I N )), RAN DF )
Given that RES1 can be collected by an attacker, an
exhaustive search can be conducted trying all the possible
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PIN codes (typically 104 values) to find the one that verifies
the previously described equation.
Once in possession of the right PIN code, the attacker can
derive UAK, which is equal to A21(RS, AC). At this point,
the attacker is able derive any future DSC session keys using
UAK to follow the execution of PP authentication protocols
and decrypt with them any communication.
4.3 Physical extraction of the key
In order to test our cryptanalysis attack with actual encrypted
communications generated by phones that had not been pre-
viously paired (e.g. FP and PP that were purchased as part of
the same set), we developed a technique to recover the UAK
directly from the memory of the FP. The full details about
this process are provided in an article written together with
David Shaw [3]. This technique has proven to be a pow-
erful physical attack that we successfully tested on a total
of seven different models of DECT cordless phones from
four different manufacturers, four of them manufactured in
2014.
The phones analysed in this work were equipped with a
24cxxx EEPROM chip that operates with the I2C protocol.
Since then, we have analysed two additional phones, one of
them equipped with a chip operating with the SPI protocol.
In all cases the EEPROM memory is used by the device to
store several parameters related to the configuration of the
DECT network, such as the RFPI or, more importantly in
the case of this study, the UAK and IPUI values of each PP
registered in the FP.
In order to extract the contents of the EEPROM memory,
we used an open source device known as the Bus Pirate to
connect to the I2C bus of the main circuit board. This device
is a multi-purpose low-cost hardware tool that is specifi-
cally designed to analyse, operate, and assist in the usage
and reverse engineering of electronic boards and integrated
circuits.
The methodology we followed consisted in identifying
the addressing mode of the memory chip, scanning the I2C
bus (or the SPI one), locating the addresses and dumping the
whole contents of the SMD EEPROMmemory into a binary
file. The specific location of theUAKwithin thememorymap
can be discovered by following the PP authentication, which
was eavesdropped, with each possible 128-bit value found in
the EEPROM to find the one that matches the response of
the PP to the challenge.
In the referred article we highlight the lack of perfect-
forward secrecy in the DECT protocol. Indeed, using an
attack able to determine the UAK such as the one we pre-
sented, it is possible for a third party to decrypt any present,
future or past communication for as long as no other pairing
is made. Our article proposes some measures to mitigate this
issue, even if the likelihood that a DECT system is compro-
mised this way is low, given that physical access to the FP is
required to extract the cryptomaterial.
5 The Nohl–Tews–Weinmann attack
The Nohl–Tews–Weinmann (NTW) attack is a known-
plaintext attack which, given a set of plaintext P , is able to
recover the 64-bit DSC key faster than an exhaustive search
over the 264 possible keys.
The first phase of the attack determines a set of affine
linear equations that specify relations about the key bits. In
the second phase the remaining bits of the key are brute-
forced to obtain the 64-bit key.
Due to the linearity of DSC, each bit of the registers can
be defined as a linear combination of bits of the key and the
IV, for a given number of clocks. The goal of the attack is to
guess enough statuses of the DSC for several sets of clocks to
obtain a sufficient number of equations to be able to perform
an exhaustive search over the remaining bits of the key.
5.1 Guessing a single status
In this section, we describe how the NTW attack manages to
retrieve a single status of the DSC. In order to do so, we first
must explain how the clocks ci of the threemain registers can
be guessed for a given round. This part of the attack takes
advantage of the linearity of the DSC stream cipher, more
precisely of the fact that the following equality holds for any
triplet of clocks sc = (c1, c2, c3):
Ssc(Key, IV) = Ssc(Key, 0) ⊕ Ssc(0, IV)
The attack is also based on the following fact: Assuming
that a register is clocked twice with a probability of 50 %, the
clock ci for the round l is distributed according to a shifted
binomial distribution with mode 2.5l + 100. Based on the
distribution, the most probable triplet(s) of clocks can be
selected. As an example, the most probable triplets for the
first round are those where each clock is either 102 or 103.
Furthermore, when the registers are clocked accordingly
to the values in sc at the end of the round l the equality
Ssc(Key, IV) = Sl(Key, IV) holds. In addition, the gen-
erated status and the bits of the keystream always verify
the equation O(Ssc(Key, IV), zl−1) = zl . Such equation is
denoted eqn(sc, l) in the rest of the paper.
The key and Ssc(Key, IV) are unknown, whereas the IVs
and the bits of the keystream are assumed to be known as
it is a known-plaintext attack. Therefore, it is possible to
test the equation eqn(sc, l) with the 64 possible statuses to
identify the subset S of them that verify it. The correct status
will necessarily belong to this subset of 32 candidates. The
influence of the IV in the status can be computed as s˜ =
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Ssc(0, IV). Assuming that sc is the correct triplet of clocks,
Ssc(Key, 0) will be in the subset S˜ = {s˜ ⊕ s∗; ∀ s∗ ∈ S}.
On the contrary, if the triplet sc is not the triplet of clocks of
round l, the correct status still has a probability of 50 % to
be in this set according to Nohl et al. [11].
Consequently, the correct status has more than 50 %
chance of being in this set, whereas any other possible status
has just a 50 % probability to be inside. This experiment can
be seen as a Bernoulli trial where a success is the presence
of the status in the list of candidates. Therefore, if repeated
a sufficient number of times, the most frequent status should
be the one of Ssc(Key, 0), given the existence of this bias.
5.2 Determination of more equations
The determination of a single status provides six linear equa-
tions that related together bits of the key. However, the
reduction of the key space would still be insufficient, as the
brute-force of the remaining 58 bits of the key would require
too much computational efforts.
In order to determine more equations for the DSC key, the
NTWattack extends this principle for eachpossible combina-
tion of clocks in a large range (35 in their article) considering
several bits of the keystream (19 in their article). For each
triplet of clocks, a frequency table is generated to store the
“score” of each potential candidate status.
Once all samples have been processed, the value of a bit
of a given register for a given clock is estimated according
to all the frequency tables where this bit is involved in. By
doing so, 108 bits of the DSC status are derived leading to a
total of 108 equations. A subset of these equations is selected
according to a certain rank (see [11] for more details) and the
solvability of the obtained system. When enough equations
have been selected (e.g. around 30) the remaining bits are
brute-forced.
5.3 Results of the Nohl–Tews–Weinmann attack
Nohl et al. have conducted their known-plaintext attack
against both simulated C-Channel and B-Field data consider-
ing different quantities of plaintext, evaluating the probability
that the system of equations defined is valid according to the
correct key. Their results are summarised in Table 1, for both
C-Channel andB-Field, considering the several sizes used for
the system of equations (10 to 40) and the different quantities
of plaintext analysed. Full details about the results obtained
by the NTW attack can be found in the original article [11].
To reach a probability of success of 50 % against the C-
Channel to define 30 equations, the attack requires at least
32,768 plaintexts. Against the B-Field, this attack reaches a
probability of success of 28 % for 30 equations with approx-
imately 65,536 different samples of plaintext. Slightly better
results can be found in the paper of Weiner et al. [13] follow-
Table 1 Success rate of the C-Channel and B-Field attack
Number of plaintext C-Channel
8192 (%) 16,384 (%) 32,768 (%)
10 Equations 2 30 96
20 Equations 0 2 78
30 Equations 0 1 48
40 Equations 0 0 11
Number of plaintext B-Field
16,384 (%) 32,768 (%) 65,536 (%)
10 Equations 2 30 92
20 Equations 0 2 65
30 Equations 0 0 28
40 Equations 0 0 4
ing an optimisation based on a new key ranking procedure.
As an example, the success probability for 32,768 available
keystreams and 22 equations goes from 71 to 90 %.
6 A theoretical model of an improved cryptanalysis
Instead of considering separately each bit of the internal sta-
tus of the DSC as done in the NTW attack, our attack directly
processes the entire status for a given range of clocks. By
doing so, all the irrelevant candidates due to the equality
of some bits and the feedback of the registers are discarded
in a preliminary step. Furthermore, the underlying theoret-
ical model used to score the potential candidates has been
refined, leading to more accurate results. Before entering
into details we summarise below the full process of our
attack.
The first stage of the attack aims to retrieve the 6-bit sta-
tuses of the DSC for each triplet of clocks of a given range of
length lenc. As the statuses of two consecutive clocks share
three bits, the final combination of statuses is 3(lenc +1)-bit
long. A frequency table containing all these possible combi-
nations, called candidates, is generated to store their score.
All the equations eqn(sc, l) relevant for this range of clocks
are evaluated for each possible candidate. The candidates
that verify a given equation increase their score by a value,
calledweight, specific to this particular equation. Thisweight
is computed according to the probability that the correct
status belongs to the specific subset of candidates that sat-
isfy the corresponding equation for a random pair of IV and
keystream.
Once all the plaintext samples are processed, all the candi-
dates are ordered according to the score they have obtained.
3(lenc + 1) linear equations linking together the bits of
the DSC key can be derived from each candidate. Starting
with the first candidate, the remaining bits of the key (i.e.
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64 − 3(lenc + 1) bits) are then brute-forced in the last step
of the attack.
6.1 Computation of the weights
In a preliminary phase, the weight of each possible equation
eqn(sc, l) for the selected range of clocks is calculated. Only
the equations with non-null weights will be evaluated during
the attack. This preliminary step is also performed in the
NTW attack. However, we have noticed experimentally that
their values were not accurate. Based on this observation,
we have refined the theoretical model by including the non-
homogeneous behaviour of the output combiner.
The weight of an equation is based on the probability that
the output combiner outputs the same bit when it takes as
input either S(tc1,tc2,tc3) or Sl . As a reminder, the equation
eqn((tc1, tc2, tc3), l) is said verified if





Obviously, if the registers are ,respectively, clocked tc1, tc2,
and tc3 times in the round l, then this equation is verifiedwith
a 100 % probability and the correct status will necessarily be
in the subset of candidates. In the following, we assume that
the probability that a register is clocked only two times at
the end of a round is 50 %. We also assume that the clock-
ing decision of each register is independent from the other
registers. The probability that a single register i is clocked







tci − (80 + 2l)
)
2−(40+l).
The probability, denoted p1, that the three main registers
are, respectively, clocked tc1, tc2, and tc3 times after the
round l, is defined as follows. For the sake of clarity we omit









When there is at least one clock difference between
(tc1, tc2, tc3) and the actual set of clocks, one could expect
that the correct status is in the subset of candidates with a
probability of 50 %, as stated in the article [11]. However,
due to the particular behaviour of the output combiner, previ-
ously described in Sect. 3.2, the probability that the equation
remains verified is not exactly 50 % when the clocks differ.
Indeed, the equation is verified with a probability of 56.25 %
if two out of the three targeted clocks are correct. The global
probability of success can, therefore, be refined.
For clarity we introduce two intermediate probabilities,
the probability p2 that only one register is not clocked the
targeted number of times and the probability p3 that at least




























(1 − Pr [ck,l = tck])
The probability that a given equation is verified can now
be expressed as
Pr [eqn(sc, l)] = p1 + 0.5625 ∗ p2 + 0.5 ∗ p3
As an example, the equation ((102, 102, 102), 1) corre-
sponding to the production of the keystream bit z1, is verified
in 50.338 % of the cases. Following the approach of [8], the
weight w(eqn(sc, l)) associated with an equation is com-
puted as the logarithmic likelihood of the probability, namely
w(eqn(sc, l)) = log
(
Pr [eqn]
1 − Pr [eqn]
)
.
The weight of all possible equations according to a given
range of clocks and a given range of keystream bits are pre-
computed using these results.
6.2 Determination of the best candidates
The precomputed weights are now used in the first step of the
attack to guess the most probable statuses of Ssc(Key, 0) for
the largest possible range of clocks R and a given set of bits
of the keystream K. T denotes the table that contains the
23(lenc+1) possible combinations of bits for the given range
of clocks. The score of each candidate is equal to the addition
of all the weights of the equations verified by this particular
candidate.
For all triplet of clocks sc ∈ R3 and all rounds l ∈ K,
the equations eqn(sc, l) are evaluated for all the possible
candidates in T . The statuses that verify a given equation
are those potentially corresponding to s˜ = Ssc(Key, I V ).
The influence of the IV in the status can be removed thanks
to the DSC linearity, as s∗ = Ssc(0, I V ) can be computed.
Therefore, the candidates that shall receive the weight of an
equation are s = s˜ ⊕ s∗. As in the NTW attack, the more
plaintexts are used, the higher the chances are that the correct
status belongs to the subset of the oneswith the higher scores.
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6.3 Exhaustive search over the remaining bits
A system of 3(lenc + 1) linear equations with 64 unknowns
can be defined from each candidate in the table T . All the
equations are independent as long as the length of the range
of clock used stays below 17 since it is the size of the smaller
register. The DSC 64-bit key will be a solution of the system
assuming the right candidate has been selected. 3(lenc + 1)
bits of the key are determined by these equations whilst the
remaining ones need to be brute-forced.We apply aGaussian
reduction to the selected system to ease this brute-force step.
In order to carry out the last step, we have developed a
CPU SIMD-based optimised implementation that loads the
system of equations and performs the exhaustive search over
the remaining bits of the key. For each possible combination
of key bits to be explored it determines the remaining ones
using the system of n equations, reducing the search to 264−n
possible keys. A portion of keystream longer than 64 − n
bits is compared against the output of DSC executed using
the candidate key and the IV that belongs to that specific
keystream. The processwill explore the entire key space until
amatch is found. Our implementation reaches approximately
a rate of 500million keys/sec in aCore i7 (AVX)workstation.
7 Improved implementation of the cryptanalysis
The attack described in the previous section is impractical
given the computational resources that would be required to
explore all possible combinations of clocks in a large enough
range to derive a sufficient number of equations to make
viable the bruteforce step.
In this section we present a probability of success vs time
trade-off to hasten considerably the execution time whilst
maintaining a good success rate.
7.1 Efficiency consideration
The parameter that ultimately influences the most the effi-
ciency of the attack is the length lenc of the clock range.
Increasing it not only speeds the final brute-force step, but
also increases the number of equations neq to be evaluated as
well as the size of the candidate tableT , both cubic functions
in lenc as formally defined below:
neq = len3c .lenk
|T | = 23(lenc+1)
To reduce the workload, we split the range of clocks in
sub-ranges and apply our attack to them. Combining the best
candidates of each of the sub-ranges frequency table allows
the determination of the same amount of status bits as in
the full range. Unfortunately, this technique also reduces
the probability of success due to the loss of contribution
from the equations related to clocks that overlap these sub-
ranges. Adding some redundancies in the definition of the
sub-ranges can be a compromise between computational
resources required to carry out the attack and probability of
success. However, the small gain in the probability of success
that we have observed is not worth compared to the loss of
efficiency introduced by the overlaps. Indeed, following this
approach more sub-ranges would be required to obtain the
same amount of linear equations.
7.2 A time-accuracy trade-off
We have considered a time-accuracy trade-off using several
sub-ranges of reasonable lengths (typically 3 or 4 clocks
each) without any overlapping between them, over which we
apply the attack previously defined in Sect. 6. A frequency
table is generated for each of these sub-ranges. Then a joint
table of the two first sub-ranges is created and populated with
the cartesian product of the NT most promising candidates
from each sub-table. The score associated with these new
candidates is initially set to the sum of the scores taken from
the two original candidate tables. The attack described in
Sect. 6.2 is reapplied to this new subset considering the equa-
tions that only involve set of clocks that spread across these
two sub-ranges. Note that the equations already processed
in the prior stage are not evaluated a second time. The
most NR promising candidates from the merged frequency
table are again extracted and combined with the ones of the
next sub-range and so on until all the sub-ranges have been
processed.
NT and NR are critical parameters as they allow to hasten
the experiment to the detriment of the success probability.
Small values decrease the number of candidates that will be
evaluated against the equations for a wider range of clocks.
At the same time, the chances that the correct candidate
belongs to the reduced list and that the attack is success-
ful are decreased. Indeed, if the algorithm fails to capture the
right status in a reduced list of a sub-range, it is certain that
it will not be present in the final joint table.
Tofindout themost convenient thresholds for the selection
of the most promising candidates, we have experimentally
determined the probability that the correct candidate is in the
reduced list. We have conducted these experiments for dif-
ferent quantities of available plaintext, for several sub-ranges
against both theC-Channel and theB-Field. Figure 5 presents
the probabilities that the correct candidate is in the top NT of
the corresponding sub-ranges for 16,384 and 32,768 avail-
able plaintexts when attacking the B-Field.
As can be observed in these figures, the increase of
available plaintexts increases the chances that the correct can-
didate is in the reduced table. However, it should be kept in
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Fig. 5 Probability that the correct candidate is in the top NT for several
sub-ranges attacking the B-Field
mind that it also increases the time required for the evaluation
of all the equations. As a consequence, the size of the reduced
table should be selected taking into consideration the quan-
tity of available plaintext, the desired probability of success
and the available time to conduct the attack. An interesting
fact is that, even if the right candidate was not in a good posi-
tion in one or more tables during the experiments (see Sect. 8
for more details on these experiments), it can still be the first
one in the final one, due to the fact the wider the range, the
more equations will contribute to the determination of the
most probable candidate.
7.3 Selection of the relevant equations
Following the approach previously described, we divide the
full range in four sub-ranges of three clocks each. For each
sub-range we only consider the keystream bits for which the
associated equations have a relevant weight for this range
of clocks. Indeed, the impact of a certain keystream bit on
a given sub-range is directly dependent on the shifted bino-
mial distribution of the clocks. As an example, the first bit
of the keystream has much more impact on the range [102,
104] than on the range [111, 113], as the distribution of the
clocks is centred in 102.5. Therefore, by evaluating in every
sub-range only the relevant set of equations we optimise the
performance of the attack.
For a given set of clocks and a given bit of keystream, the
bias of the corresponding equation is the difference between
the probability that such equation is verified and the expected
probability of 50 %. Given a range of clocks and a keystream
bit, the associated accumulated bias is the sum of the bias of
each possible equation from the given range of clocks for the
specific bit of the keystream. Figure 6 represents graphically
the computed accumulated bias for different keystream bits
and sub-ranges of clocks. Based on these results, we have
selected the list of pertinent equations to be evaluated in each
sub-range.
It can be observed in Fig. 6 that the accumulated bias for a
given keystream bit decreases proportionally to the position
of the bit considered. For example, the accumulated bias of
the bit 41 (first bit of the keystream related to the B-Field) is
almost half compared to the first bit of the keystream. This
is a direct result of the irregular clocking and the increas-
ing uncertainty about the specific combination of clocks that
generated that bit. Therefore, the probability that an equation
related to this bit gets verified, decreases as well. That is the
reason why more plaintext samples are required to conduct
a successful attack using B-Field data instead of C-Channel
data.
8 Experimental results of our attack
In order to test experimentally our cryptanalysis attack, we
have conducted several experiments, bothwith simulated and
actual data, aimed at validating and benchmarking it. Two
scenarios using data originated from the C-Channel and the
B-Field have been considered respectively for the ranges of
clocks [102, 113] and [202, 213].
For all the experiments, we have followed the approach
described in the previous section where the full range is
divided in four sub-ranges of three clocks each and the first 9
bits of the corresponding segment of the keystream are used
for the attacks.
8.1 Results based on simulated data
In this section we present our experimental results using sim-
ulated data. We have generated a total of 200 random DSC
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Fig. 6 Accumulated bias for sub-ranges of 3 clocks
keys and for each one we have created several sets of plain-
text samples (IV and keystream) of different sizes. For each
of the 200 keys, the first IV of the first sample was generated
randomly and the subsequent IVs incrementally, mimicking
the behaviour of actual DECT devices.
Each set of plaintext represents a recordingof an encrypted
DECT conversation, where each packet contains the IV in
clear and the payload encrypted with a unique keystream.
The total amount of plaintext is directly linked to the number
of minutes of the encrypted voice call that had to be recorded
to obtain them. For the cryptanalysis, the values NT and NR
were, respectively, set to 200 and 50.
An interesting finding in our experiments is that when the
attack was unsuccessful, often only a few bits of the best
candidate differed from those of the correct candidate. Most
of the time these wrong bits were the ones at the edge of the
Table 2 Success rate of the C-Channel and B-Field attack for the
respective range [102, 113] and [202, 213]
Number of plaintext C-Channel
4096 (%) 8192 (%) 16,384 (%)
9 Equations 35 85 98
21 Equations 16 73 97
33 Equations 6 55 95
39 Equations 2 33 84
Number of plaintext B-Field
8192 (%) 16,384 (%) 32,768 (%)
9 Equations 19 69 94
21 Equations 10 57 90
33 Equations 3 36 82
39 Equations 1 21 66
range (e.g. the bits for 102 and 113 for the range [102, 113]).
Therefore, the probability of success of the attack can be
increased by discarding these status bits, at the cost of reduc-
ing the number of equations and increasing the time required
for the final exhaustive search. For example, discarding the
two bits at the edge of the candidate reduces the number of
linear equations from 39 to 33.
Table 2 displays the percentage of time the correct status
was output in first position by our attack so that our results
can be compared on a fair basis with the ones of the NTW
attack [11].
Our results can additionally be improved (up to 10% addi-
tional keys retrieved) when the brute-force step sequentially
evaluates the next possible candidates output in the final
table. For example, while the success probability is about
69 % when using 39 equations attacking the B-Field with
32K plaintexts, it increases to 76 % by considering the final
output list. Considering 33 equations, our attack guesses the
correct candidate with a probability slightly higher than 50%
when using 8192 plaintexts from the C-Channel. In this case,
the final exhaustive search step is able to retrieve the correct
key in less than 5 s using our CPU SIMD-based implemen-
tation in an i7 multi core (AVX) workstation. To reach a
more or less equivalent success rate, the NTW cryptanaly-
sis attack requires at least four times more plaintext material.
The success probability can be raised tomore than 70%using
only 21 equations at the price of a longer but still reasonable
exhaustive search of less than 5 h.
Although at a first sight it seems much more interesting
to attack the C-Channel rather than the B-Field, based on the
number of requested plaintext, it shall be noted that only a
limited amount of DECT packets are typically sent per sec-
ond (around 5) carrying C-Channel data, in comparison with
the 100 that are sent per second carrying B-Field data during
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a voice communication. Consequently, 20 times more plain-
text is produced in the B-Field which makes the attack more
realistic in this scenario in terms of minimum call duration
required to gather enough cryptomaterial.
As an example, to reach a 55 % chance to retrieve the key
using C-Channel plaintext, 27 min of conversation have to
be recorded, whereas the NTW attack would require more
than 1 h and 50 min to reach an equivalent success rate.
Considering a B-Field attack, our attack achieves a success
rate of 36 % using just 163 s of communication when the
NTW attack needs more than 11 min to reach equivalent
results.
8.2 Results based on actual data
In order to validate our findings in practice we have used
several DECT cordless phones, from several manufacturers,
that we have previously verified and found to be encrypted
following the approach described by Sanchez et al. [12] and
briefly introduced in Sect. 4.1.
In a first round, we validated our attack assuming 100 %
accuracy in the prediction of the plaintext. In order to do so,
we have extracted the UAK of the targeted phones using our
pairing attack as briefly described in Sect. 4.2. Thanks to this
long-term key we were able to obtain the session key and
consequently the plaintext required to test our attack.
Our first attempts to recover the key were performed
analysing 5 min of DECT encrypted calls (corresponding to
32K samples) from several handsets of different commercial
brands available in the domestic market. In our first round of
experiments our attacks had a success rate of over 66 % tar-
geting the encrypted voice. A second round of tests analysing
10 min of calls were 100 % successful.
8.3 Predictability of C-channel plaintext
The C-channel messages transported in the A-field of certain
DECT packets are used to exchange control data between FP
and PP. For example, C-channel messages are used during
the initialisation of a phone call to authenticate the FP and
PP and derive a DSC session key (DCK). C-channel is also
used to exchange other messages related to the encryption
process or to transmit information about the duration of the
ongoing phone call. The set of control messages that can be
exchanged are defined in the ETSI DECT standard [4].
Once the DCK has been negotiated during the initialisa-
tion of the call, FP and PP can agree to encrypt C-Channel
data. When the C-Channel is encrypted, an attacker can still
exploit the predefined structure of these messages to predict
parts of their content. Furthermore, the periodicity and posi-
tion of a given C-Channel message in a communication can
provide additional hints about its content.
To evaluate in practice the feasibility of predicting the
plaintext of C-channel messages, we have analysed the com-
munications of different phones from several manufacturers
that we know use encryption to protect voice communica-
tions.
Many phones turn on the encryption of the C-channel as
soon as the DCK is negotiated, typically within the first 2 s of
the communication. It is worth noting that during this brief
period both voice and C-channel information are transmitted
in cleartext.An attacker can analyse the content of the packets
involved in the C-channel communication before the encryp-
tion is activated to gain knowledge about the plaintext and the
communication pattern. Once the encryption is activated for
the C-channel, the attacker can use that knowledge to predict
the first 9 bits of the plaintext that will be encrypted in the
packets involved.Moreover, we noted thatmany phones send
periodically encrypted C-channel messages with predictable
content during a phone call. The predictability of this con-
tent, which depends on the branch and model of the DECT
system that is used, can enable an attacker to collect enough
keystream material to carry out a successful attack.
To our surprise, some phones that fully encrypt the voice
communication (B-field) do not encrypt the C-channel at
all. In these cases, the C-Channel communication cannot be
used as a source of plaintext to carry out the DSC crypt-
analysis attack, which must rely exclusively on B-field data,
much more difficult to predict. Therefore, even though leav-
ing the C-channel communications unencrypted implies that
an attacker can eavesdrop the data exchanged, often these
data are not particularly relevant or sensitive. As suggested
by Nohl et al. in [11], leaving the C-channel communication
unencrypted paradoxically contributes to enhance the privacy
of the voice communication by removing an easy source of
predictable plaintext.
8.4 Partially-known plaintext attack
Our experimental results have shown that our attack can be
successfully carried out usingB-Field data as source of plain-
text. However, B-Field plaintext cannot be easily predicted
given that it contains the digitally encoded voice of the two
speakers. Given that in DECT the voice of each speaker will
be transmitted independently from the other one, we could
assume that periods of silence will occur during a standard
conversation in both directions. As pointed out by [11], these
segments of silence can be a useful source of plaintext with
perfect silence producing all ones in the digitally encoded
voice.
We have analysed several actual DECTvoice communica-
tions recorded in a quiet environment, thus containing silence
that could occur in realistic conditions, in order to understand
up to what extend the plaintext could be predicted. We have
found out that depending on the equipment and the back-
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Fig. 7 Probability that the correct candidate belongs to the reduced list
ground noise, the accuracy of the recovered keystream, under
the assumption that the plaintext was pure silence, ranges
from 85 to 95 %.
When one of the bits of the keystream derived from the
prediction of the plaintext is wrong, the probability that the
correct status belongs to the candidate list drops to 50 % for
all the equationswhere this bit is involved.We could consider
that the vote cast by those equations is randomly distributed
among the possible candidates. This fact reduces the overall
probability that the candidate belongs to the reduced list of a
sub-ranges.
To verify this statement, we have experimentally deter-
mined the probability that the correct candidate is included
in the reduced list of the sub-range [202, 204], for several
degrees of inaccuracy in the prediction of the keystream.
The results of the experiment are shown in Fig. 7. This
observed loss of accuracy can be compensated by increas-
ing the size of the reduced list at the cost of the overall
efficiency. Analysing more plaintexts can also contribute to
compensate this loss. To measure the impact in the prob-
ability of success, we have benchmarked our attack using
simulated B-Field data assuming the knowledge of 32,768
and 65,536 plaintexts with several degrees of accuracy. The
results presented in Table 3 show the success probabilities
to retrieve the session key among the final output list of
candidates.
We have also used actual DECT encrypted voice commu-
nications to validate that our attack works in practice even
when the plaintext is only partially known. When mostly
silence is transmitted, our prediction of plaintext is accu-
rate at approximately 90 %. All our attempts using 65K
plaintexts defining 39 linear relations amongst the key bits
were successful. The success rate of the tests we have con-
ducted using 32K plaintexts are consistent with the results of
Table 3.
Table 3 Success rate of the B-Field attack for the range [202, 213]
Accuracy of plaintext 32,768 Plaintexts
100 % 95 % 90 % 85 %
9 Equations 96 92 71 55
21 Equations 91 78 57 37
33 Equations 85 65 42 21
39 Equations 81 56 28 11
Accuracy of plaintext 65,536 Plaintexts
100 % 95 % 90 % 85 %
9 Equations 100 100 100 92
21 Equations 100 100 96 81
33 Equations 99 98 87 70
39 Equations 99 94 85 63
8.5 Taking advantage of the codec behaviour
We have made an interesting discovery analysing data
decrypted from actual DECT voice communications. The
distribution of the zeros, bits differing from digitally encoded
pure silence, is not uniform over the 9 bits of the keystream
that are required for our attack. We have noticed unexpected
patterns in groups of 4 bits, probably derived from the way
the G726 codec encodes the voice. The Least Significant Bit
(LSB) in each of these 4-bit group has a higher probability
to be a zero.
We have recorded several hours of pure silence in an ane-
choic chamber to evaluate the observed patterns. Around
90.7 % in average of the bits of the plaintext transmitted
by the FP were ones. The two LSB in the 4-bit groups, more
precisely the fourth and the eighth bits of the byte, had a
probability of around 80 % to be zeros.
The fact that some bits of the keystream are more
likely to be zeros than others should be taken into account
during the computation of the weight. We have thus intro-
duced such possibility in the probability computation. The
updated probabilities are the following where err [l] denotes
the probability that the l-th bit of the keystream is
wrong:
p1_new = p1 ∗ (err [l − 1] ∗ err [l]
+ 0.5 ∗ (1 − err [l − 1]))
p2_new = p2 ∗ (0.5625 ∗ err [l − 1] ∗ err [l]
+ 0.5 ∗ (1 − err [l − 1])
+ 0.4375 ∗ err [l − 1] ∗ (1 − err [l]))
Note that when at least two registers are not clocked the
targeted number of times the probability that the equation
is verified remain of 50 % even if the prediction about the
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Table 4 Success rate of the attack using silence for the range [202,
213] using 32K plaintext
Old model (%) New model (%)
9 Equations 71 79
21 Equations 61 67
33 Equations 43 50
39 Equations 39 43
plaintext is wrong. The new probability that a given equation
is verified is now:
Pr [eqn(sc, l)] = p1_new + p2_new + 0.5 ∗ p3
We have conducted a series of tests to compare the suc-
cess rate of the old and the new probability models for both
32K and 65K of plaintext of B-Field communication. In the
latter case, the success rates were not significantly different
whereas in the first case, the updated model performed better
than the old one. The results are displayed in Table 4.
9 Conclusions and future developments
In this paper we have presented an improved cryptanaly-
sis attack against the DECT Standard Cipher, leveraging
the clock guessing approach introduced by the NTW attack.
Compared to it, our approach offers higher success prob-
ability, requiring four times less amount of keystream
material.
Our attack is able to retrieve the key with a probability of
success of 55%using 33 linear equations and 213 keystreams
of C-channel following an exhaustive search over 231 keys.
In comparison to it, the NTW attack requires 215 keystreams
to reach a probability of success of 48 % after exploring
234 keys using 30 equations. Attacking encrypted voice our
attack provides consistent results requiring 2.8 min of voice
communication (corresponding to 214 keystreams of B-field)
to reach a probability of success of 36 % using 33 equa-
tions and searching 231 keys. In a similar scenario the NTW
requires 10.9 min of communication (corresponding to 216
keystreams of B-field) to reach 28 % of probability of suc-
cess with 30 equations and an exhaustive search over 234
keys.
We have also successfully applied our attack to actual
voice communications eavesdropped fromcommercialDECT
phones that use encryption. Furthermore, we have explored
experimentally the use of silence in the voice communica-
tion as source of predictable plaintext and demonstrated that
our attack can still work with a non-perfect prediction of the
plaintext, albeit with a lower probability of success. In this
scenario we have been able to improve our attack, taking
advantage of the patterns we have observed in the distribu-
tion of probabilities over the bits of the keystream to reduce
the influence of this loss of accuracy in the prediction of the
plaintext, improving the success rate of our attack under these
conditions.
The results of our work demonstrate that DSC cipher
is weaker than previously thought and that passive attacks
against the privacy of encrypted DECT communications are
feasible in practice. Whilst continuous renegotiation of the
DSC key during a communication could help to mitigate the
privacy risk, we recommend it to be done at least every 30 s
to prevent an attacker from being able to retrieve enough
cryptomaterial to conduct a successful attack. However, it
is our opinion that only the effective roll-out of the DSC-
2 cipher now available in the DECT standard can be seen
as a definitive solution to the privacy risk introduced by the
vulnerabilities of the DSC cipher.
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